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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
PEARL McCONKIE PERRY,
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)
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J. ARCHIE McCONKIE and
WILLIAM H. McCONKIE,
Defendants and Apellants

Brief of Respondent
Becaus,e of the lengthy quotations set forth in appellants' brief from respondent's findings of fact, respondent
now prefers to come to grips with appellants' argument
rather than to spend time in a preliminary statement. A
further narration of the facts wHl necessarily appear as respondent presents her argument. We desir·e to correct one
error in appellants' preliminary statement, namely that the
vespondent Pearl McConkie Perry is the only dissatisfied
heir of Virtus F. McConkie. This is not true. There were
five brothers and sitsers in this estate. Two of the brothers
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2
are defendants and one sister is plaintiff. Another sister,
Marie, testified on behalf of the defendants and the heirs
of the other deceased sister, Leona, are represented by counsel who appear for plaintiff and thave joined iwth plaintiff
in prosecuting this action although their names do not appear in the cause. The children, therefore, line up two
against three. Moreover, as we shall point out later, the
sister Marie who testified on behalf of the defendants was
far from a disinterested witness or one who stood to benefit by the plaintiff's position as defendants argue. She had
aJlready been "taken care of" by a sizeable conveyance at
the time of the trial.
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DID VIRTUS F. McCONKIE OWN THE LaPOINT
RANCH AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH?
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Her·ein we shall meet the arguments of a;ppellants advanced in Points I, II, and III of their brief.
The LaPoint property now claimed by defendants and
omitted from the Virtus F. M~cConkie Estate consisted of
three separate parcel'S of land which were being purchased
under contract of sale by one Myron Hacking and one John
S. Hacking, both of whom were dead at the time of the
trial herein. It is undisputed that Myron Hacking and
John S. Hacking by instruments in writing (Plaintiff's Exhibits A, B and C) assigned all of their right, title and interest in and to these three parcels of land to Virtus F.
McGonkie. The assignments were ea.ch consummated on
the 29th day of April, H~18. Each of the assignments was
executed in the pres,ence of a Notary PubHc, Herbert Ty-
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zack, who was also dead at the time of the trial herein.
These facts are all admitted and indeed are clearly appa~ent
from an examination of the said assignm·ents themselves.
On the 29th day of April, 1918, therefo~e, the contract equities in the lands in question were vested in Virtus F. McConkie. Virtus F. McConkie did not die until February 20,
1920. The property described in the assignments was never
listed or inventoried in the estate of Virtus F. McConkie,
deceased and over 25 years later, namely shortly prior to
February 14, 1946, the defendant J. Archie McConkie for
the first time presented these assignm,ents to the State
Land Board of the State of Utah and patents were issued to
him on February 14, 1946. In the meantime the given name
of the true assignee "Virtus F." had been removed from
each of the instruments by ink eradicator or erasures or
both and the given name of the defendant "J. Archie" had
been substituted in each of said assignments. J. Percy Goddard, a handwriting ·expert, testified without contradiction
that the several assignmens and affidavits had been completely executed and notarized before the obliterations were
made. While endeavoring to obliterate the name of his deceased father, the clumsy J. Archie McConkie rubbed out
part of the notary seal. The testimony of Mr. Goddard
alone is enough to positively establish that these assignments were completed, and therefor·e the interest of Myron
Hacking and John S. Hacking in the land was effectively
transferred to Virtus F. M·cConkie, prior to the time of the
alteration of the docum·ents. Respondent need not depend
entirely on this testimony, however, because the defendant
William H. McConkie himself testified that the alteration
was made over a year subsequent to AprH 29, 1918, namely
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in the fall of 1919 (Trans. p. 135). We are not hound by
that answer because the question was objectionable and
was objected to under the dead man statute and the statute
of frauds rbut defendants are bound by the admission that
the alteration was subsequent to April 1918, the date of the
execution of the assignments.
In the analysis of this case we are then brought squarely to these propositions: FIRST, Title to the LaPoint property was transferred to Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, by
an instrument in writing and SECOND, there is no instrument or conveyance whatsoever from Virtus F. McConkie
to the defendant J. Archie McConkie, the present claimant.
Appellants in their brief have made no argument upon this
point and have not ev·en hinted as to how J. Archie McConkie .claims he obtained ·the title to this property from his deceased father, Virtus F. McConkie. There is no valid argument which they can make on this point. The dead man
statute prevented them from testifying as to any conversation or transaction with their deceased father whi0h would
assail his estate, and if they had been able to so testify
they fall squarely in the teeth of the Statute of Frauds,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 33-5-1, which reads as fO'llows:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor
any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwis·e than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
The contracts of sale above mentioned relate to in-
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terests in land and Virtus F. McConkie certainly had an
equitable interest in the land described in the contracts
of sale. The contracts of sale were all but paid out at
the time of his death. It would take an instrument in
writing signed by him or by his agent thereunto authorized
in writing, to transmit that interest to J. Archie McConkie.
There is no such writing. The defendants cannot prevail in
this •law suit. Our position that the inte~est of Virtus F.
McConkie in these contracts of sale is an interest in land
wihin the meaning of the Statute of Frauds is sustained
by Young v. Corless 56 Utah 564, 191 P. 647 and McNeil v.
McNeil 61 Utah 141, 211 P. 988. It seems too clear to admit
of debate that the change in the name of the assignee in
the assignments to these contracts of sale by Archie McCon:kie would not operate as a conveyance. It follows as an
inescapable ·Conclusion that the equitable title to the LaPoint land was vested in Virtus F. McConkie at the time
of his death and it should have been listed as one of the
assets of his estate, and the defendant J. Archie McConkie
now holds legal title ther·eto in trust for the heirs of Virtus
F. McConkie, deceased.
This is a case where the conduct and actions of the
defendants are most significant and an examination of the
altered docum•ents is most revealing and the writers of thi's
brief respectfully request the members of this court to
personally examine the exhibits and in particular, Plaintiff's
Exhibits A, B and C. The originals thereof which are in
the office of the Secretary of State are even more revealing than the photostatic copies which were necessarily substituted therefor at the trial. The badges and earmarks of
fraud, dedeption and dark dealing are strikingly apparent.
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It is perf.ectly clear from an examination of Exhibits A, B

and C that Virtus F. McConkie was not present when the
alterations occurred. In particular, attention is called to
the witness lines at the top of each assignm~ent. The first
witness was Herbert Tyzack, who was likewise the notary
public. On the second line there appears the surname McConkile. In his effort to remov·e the name of his deceased
father from any connection with the documents the defendant, J. Archie McConkie, by use of ink eradicator removed
the given name of Virtus F. McConkie on the witness line
but left the surname of McConkie in the handwriting of
his deceased father. The assignments would not have been
invalidated because of the fact that the name of Virtus F.
McConkie appeared on the witness line. The defendant
J. Archie McConkie apparently was confused in the execution of his fraudulent scheme and he erased more than he
need do and thereby left the surname of his deceased father
to testify ·against him.
Let it also be observed that these land sale contracts
were entered into by the State of Utah with the original
conracting parties on June 26, 1911, and that at the time of
the death of Virtus F. McConkie the contracts were practically paid in full. The last contract paym,ents were made
on January 5, 1921, prior to the time the inventory and ap·
p~aisement was filed in the Virtus F. McConkie estate. If
these contracts ever belonged to the defendants they belonged to them on January 5, 1921 and the patents could
have been issued at that time.
Why did the defendants secretly hold the contracts of
sale until shortly prior to F·ebruary 14, 1946, a period of
twenty-five years?
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Plaintiff does not know when, following the death of
Virtus F. 1\'IcConkie, these instruments were altered and
mutilated by the defendants but in the long interim Tom
O'Donnel, the attorney who probated the estate, Tyzack
the notary public who notarized the signatures of Myron
and JohnS. Hacking the assignors of the contracts of sale,
and the assignors themselves had died. The defendants
purposely waited until death sealed the lips of those who
might expose their fraudulent actions. It took them twenty-five years to get up enough courage to take thes~e forged
and mutilated instruments to the State Land Board for the
issuance of patents.
The said documents which were at last surrendered to
the State Land Board of the State of Utah by the unclean
and trembling hands of J. Archie McConkie speak against
him and position taken by him and his co-conspirator and
co-defendant William H. McConkie more loudly and conclusively than any oral or written argument which might
be advanced. The trial court was impressed by these documents and we feel certain that the members of the Supreme
Court will be equaHy impressed if they personally examine
the same.
II

DID THE ASSIGNMENT BY THE HEIRS IN 1922 AND
THE DECREE OF THE COURT IN 1924 HAVE THE
EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTIN~ THE LaPOINT
PROPERTY WHICH WAS NOT LISTEn
OR INVENTORIED IN THE ESTATE?
Herein we meet the argument advanc·ed in Point V in
Appellants' Brief.
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It seems moot ev·en to argue this proposition. It is true
the defendants in their third defense in their answer set
forth the estate assignment execut·ed on February 25, 1922
by the McConkie heirs (Defendants' Exhibit 1). The defendants, however, do not daim that title vested in the defendant J. Archie McConkie either directly or indirectly by
virtue of defendants' Exhibit 1 but daim that by reason
of her e~ecuting the said instrument the plaintiff "is estopped from claiming any right or interest in the said property
described in her complaint." The position of the defendants
at all times throughout the trial and in ·their argument on
the appeal is that title to the LaPoint property is vested in
the defendant J. Archie McConkie because of the issuance
of patents from the State of Utah to him upon surrender
of the assigned contracts of sale. Nowher-e in their pleadings do the defendants attempt to deraign title through the
so--called estate assignment of February 24, 1922 (Defendants' Exhibit 1) but only assert an estoppel against plaintiff on account thereof. We submit that none of the elements of an estoppel are either pleaded or proved. The defendants are not innocent parties who r-elied to their detriment upon some representation or conduct on the part of
the plaintiff. On the contrary, they are fraudulent conspirators who, either alone or in conjunction with their deceased
mother, purposely omitted the listing or inventorying of
the LaPoint property and lead plaintiff and the other heirs
to believe that the LaPoint property belonged to the defendand that no part of it belonged to the estate. They are in
poor position to urge an estoppel bas-ed upon their own
fraud.
Again-a review of the documents themselves is more
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rewarding than argument. The manner in which the estate
was handled spells out what the parties intended. The inventory and appraisement does not list the LaPoint property and the entire listed estate was appraised at the sum
of $15,040.00. Virtus F. McConkie died intestate. Onethird of the estate belonged to the surviving wife and the
other two-thirds, approximately $10,000.00 in value, belonged to the five sons and daughters of deceased and accordingly and based upon said specific inventory and listing of he properties of deceased the plaintiff and her sisters
agreed to accept from the defendants the sum of $2,000.00
each in exchange for their interest in the listed estate property. Plaintiff joined with other heirs in executing the
estate assignment only upon being assured that the property of deceased was that listed in the estate file. It is true
that an omnibus clause contained in the decree of distribution will have the effect of distributing all property of
deceased but this is not true if the heirs have been misled
and deceived as to what assets belonged to deceas,ed. Such
is our case. Fraud vitiates the whole transaction. The
defendants are not assignees or grantees in this assignment. The assignment is to the mother. The defendants are not innocent purchasers. They have at all tim,es
known about the fraud. The mother may or may not have
known about it. The mother is not relying upon the estate
assignment. She is not a party to the litigation. Only the
perpetrators of the fraud rely on it. They seek to sustain
their title by pointing to an instrument which was signed
by the plaintiff when she was acting under the influence of
the belief which she entertained that the boys and not the
father owned this property. This belief was caused by their
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concealments and misrepreS'entations. They seek to take
advantage of their own wrongs. This neither law nor equity
will sanction.
The assignment could not operate as a conveyance
aside from the question of fraud. The paramount object in
the construction of a deed, and tJhe rule for the same in the
construction of an assignment (5 Corpis Juris 943, Section
116)), is to give effect to the intention of the parties to it.
Such intention is to be gathered from a consideration of the
entire instrument wri·tten in the light of circumstances under which it was executed. See: Wise v. Watts, 9 Cir., 239
P. 207, 218, 152 C.C.A. 195, certiorari denied 244 U. S. 661,
37 S. Ct. 745, 61 L. Ed. 1376. When the members of the
McConkie family executed the assignment transferring
their respective inter·ests in the property of which their
father died seized and possessed to their mother, all parties
to the conveyance ·except the two brothers, defendants in
this action, and probably the mother were thinking about
the real estate and personal property which the administratrix had returned to the court as being property of the
estate. At that time discussion was had with respect to
the LaPoint property. The defendants and the mother
stated that the LaPoint property belonged to the defendants (Tr. p. 139). The assignment was made broad
enough to cover all of the property of deceased then known
and which is described in the inventory and appraisement
as well as any other property which was not then known to
them and which he owned or in which he had any interest.
But it is so dear as almost to be self-evident that they did
not intend the assignment to include the LaPoint property
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now in litigation because they definitely had such property
in mind and considered that their father had no interest
in it. Since none of the heirs considered the LaPoint prop-

erty to be affected by the estate assignment surely the
court will not now find and hold to the contrary. The only
reason plaintiff agreed to receive and did receive $2,000.00
as her share of the estate was because there was $10,000.00
worth of property to be divided among five sons and
daughters and one-fifth thereof equaled $2,000.00.
The decree of distribution in the McConkie estate is
no better than the assignment upon which it rests. The
assignment is merged in the decree. Hopkins v. White, 20
Calif. 234, 128 P. 780. Whatsoever title was conveyed by

plaintiff to her mother by the assignment was confirmed
in the mother by the decree. But no more. Since the assignment is merged in the decree the latter is evidence of
nothing that is not evidenced by the former and the latter
is open to the same construction as the former and is also
subject to the same infirmities. Since the assignment is
vitiated by fraud the decree is likewise so vitiated. The
general principles applicwble to the construction of judgments are applied in construing an order or decree of distribution. Judgments must be construed as a whole. In case
of ambiguity or doubt the entire record may be examined
or considered, Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52. Since
the court may examine the entire record to determine the
meaning of the. decree of distribution it may look to the
assignment which is the basis of the decree and in so looking it will see that the LaPoint property is not included.
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III
IS PLAINTIFF BARREn FROM RECOVE:RY HEREIN
BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
OR LACHES?
Defendants contend that plaintiff knew or should have
known of her father's claim or interest in the LaPoint property at the time the estate was being probated and therefor·e her right to recovery is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Statute of Limitations which was then applicable to our action was that of Utah Code Annotated
1943, 104-2-24 (3). The three-year statute of limitations
governs fraud cases. In 1947 the plaintiff first heard something was irregular; she actually learned of the fraud in
April, 1949, and started her action in November 1949.
Defendants say plaintiff must have known her father
owned the LaPoint property because it is set forth in her
complaint in the earlier action that the property was purposely omitted from the estate by agreement of the heirs
to save expens-es. Plaintiff denies there was any such agreement. (Tr. p. 214-217). Defendants do not claim there was
any such agreement among the heirs. All parties agree
there was no such understanding. It is, therefore, idle to
spend time arguing this contention.
Defendants, however, say that we should hav·e mistrusted them and their mother, should not have believed
the representations made by all three, but s·hould have conducted an independent investigation and commenced an
action when the estate was in probate. Let us look at the
situation which prevailed. The defendants were grown men
and were both unmarried and immediately following their
father's death they, along with their mother, took over the
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handling of the affairs. On the other hand the plaintiff at•
that time was divorced and had several small children.
She relied implicitly in the representations and good faith
of her brothers and her mother. Her mother was appointed
administratrix but the actual handling of the property and
affairs was more or less left to the defendants (Tr. p. 136).
The defendant J. Archie McConkie testified moreover that
a partnership relation existed between him, his co-defendant
and their mother from the time of their father's death until
the year 1937 (Tr. p. 246). The defendant William H. McConkie stated that he and his brother assisted their mother
in handling the affairs of their father after his death (Tr.
p. 105). The defendants lived with their mother at all
times following their father's death in the year 1920 to the
year 1937 (Tr. p. 106, 161). In the several conferences
which lead up to the execution of the assignment in the
estate (Defendants' Exhibit 1) the mother .stated to the
heirs which property belonged to deceased and which property belonged to the boys (Tr. p. 116) and when the mother
made the statements the defendants didn't say anything to
the contrary (Tr. p. 139). The mother stated that the LaPoint property had been bought for the boys (Tr. p. 147).
That language in itself is significant. She didn't say the
boys bought it-she said it had been bought for the boys.
Was the plaintiff, who at this time was burdened with
the problem of supporting herself and her minor children,
unreasonable in relying upon the representations made by
her own mother and by her elder brothers who were looking
after the affairs of the estate? W·e say she was not unreasonable and that there was nothing to excite her attention until word leaked out that the patents had finally been
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issued. On the contrary, there was a relationship of trust
and confidence between plaintiff and her mother and her
brothers. There was not only a blood relationship but the

,::u

mother with the active management of the brothers was
administering the estate as a fiduciary. Plaintiff believed
them and relied upon them (Tr. p. 32 et passim). Had she
gone to the records at the County Court House or at the
State Capitol she would have found no instruments which
would have indicated that her father was the owner of the
LaPoint land. The equity in the land was not being taxed
in 1920, 1921 or 1922 (Tr. p. 83). The contracts of sale at the
State Capitol stood in the names of John S. and Myron
Hacking. The brothers had worked on the LaPoint land
with their father, and when the administratrix who was
also her mother told the plaintiff the land belonged to the
boys the plaintiff acted reasonably in believing that it did
belong to the boys and not to her father. As defendants
argue in their brief plaintiff believed the defendants owned
the LaPoint property.
There is a conflict in the testimony between the plaintiff on the one hand and her sister, Marie Johnson, and the
latter's husband, Virden R. Johnson, on the other hand.
Defendants in their brief place great stress upon the testimony from the "disinterested witness," Marie Johnson. She
was such a willing witness that it required the combined
efforts of the court, opposing counsel and her own attorneys
to restrain her enthusiasm at the trial (Tr. bottom half of p.
185 and top half of p. 186). Marie Johnson, however, after
the pot began to boil in 1947, received a deed to a valuable
piece of property from the mother. This deed was executed
July 19, 1948 (Tr. p. 251). It was the co-def.endants who
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actually paid the money to construct the home situated
on this property. They expended for the improvements
alone the sum of $3,800.00 (Tr. p. 143). Marie Johnson and
her husband, Virden R. Johnson, had been rewarded by the
conveyance to them of this improved land, and it is against
this background that the interest and testimony of Marie
and Virden R. Johnson was evaluated by the trial court and
must be evaluated upon appeal.
It is little wonder that the trial court was not impressed
by the vacillating testimony of the defendant J. Archie
McConkie. See the transcript at page 246:
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Following your father's
death state whether or not you and your brother
Will and your mother operated as co-partners?
A. We did, we worked together.
Q. And you continued to work as. co-partners,
the three of you, until your mother's death, did
you?
A. No sir, until '37 about.
Q. Did you have the LaPoint property included in that partnership?
A. Yes, we had that along too.
Q. That was right within the partnership,
was it?
A. No, no.
Q. What was your answer, yes or no?
A. No sir, that wasn't exactly along with the
rest of the stuff.
Q. Wasn't exactly?
A. No, it wasn't partnership along with all of

it.
Q. You claimed that as your own, did you?

A. Well,-
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Q. Answer that yes or no.
A. Well, it would be yes and no. Will had an
interest in it too.
This defendant's attorney only risked four questions
with him upon direct examination (Tr. p. 238).
The conflict in testimony was resolved in favor of the
plaintiff. The trial court heard and saw the witness·es, observed their demeanor and believed one against several.
Its decision in so doing should not be disturbed.
IV
IS PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IN EQUITY MAINTAINABLE
WITHOUT REOPENING THE VIRTUS F.
McCONKIID ESTATE?
Herein we meet Point VI of Defendants Brief.
At the outset we point out that the want of legal capacity to sue is waived unless it is attacked by the answer
or under the old rules by demurrer or answer. Chamberlain
et al v. Larsen et al (Utah) 29 P. 2d 355; Tooele Meat &
Storage Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 57 Utah 1, 116 P. 427. So
it is with waiver of nonjoinder or misjoinder: Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Building & Improvement Co., 20 Utah 267, 58 P. 843, also Salt Lake City
v. Salt Lake Investment Co., 43 Utah 181, 134 P. 603. Neither by demurrer or answer have the defendants raised any
question with respect to the form of this action. Capacity
to sue must be raised by the pleadings, otherwise it is
waived:
"Moreover, no objection was made at the proper time and in the proper manner to plaintiff's ca-
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pacity to sue either by a demurrer or answer and
therefore if there had been any merit to this contention it was waived." Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47
Utah 17 4, 152 P. 424.
In the case now before the court the probate proceedings were conducted from 1920 to June 2, 1924, when the
administratrix was discharged. Notice to creditors was
given and all creditors paid. To reopen the estate would
not only have been a useless ceremony but also a diminishing one inasmuch as by the reappointment of an administrator a needless expense would have been entailed. The
only question is where rests the title to the property. The
court had full power and jurisdiction to enter its decree
thereon.
Defendants contend that plaintiff's suit is a collateral
attack upon the Decree of Distribution in the probate of the
Estate of Virtus F. McConkie, which may not he maintained; and they cite lntermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 Pac.
2d 157, to support their theory that the attack of the plaintiff in the instant case is collateral. However, the case of
lntermill v. Nash, supra, recognizes the requirement that
the res must be before the court in order that the judgment
import verity, prove itself, and he invulnerable to attack
by any indirect assaults. In the instant case, the res was
not before the court in the probate of the Estate of Virtus
F. McConkie, but rather was deliberately and fraudulently
concealed from the court.
A decree of distribution does not constitute a bar to an
equitable action based upon fraud. See In re Madsen's Estate, 87 Pac. 2d 903:
"It is * * * well settled that where, through
extrinsic fraud practiced in probate proceedings,
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distributees have obtained property to which they
were not entitled, equity will do justice not by
overthrowing the decree of distribution but by declaring the distributees hold the property in trust
for the rightful owners. * * * This character of relief is very common in the matter of fraudulent
probate proceedings. The order or decree from the
effect of which relief is sought cannot constitute
a bar to such equitable action. As has been said, it
is solely because of the order or decree, collaterally
unassaila}ble and valid on its face, that the equitable jurisdiction is necessary and exists."
In the case of Simonton et al v. Los Angeles Trust &
Savings Bank, et al, 221 Pac. 368, an executrix fraudulently
and designedly concealed certain shares of stock from the
notice, attention and consideration of .the probate court,
and the same was not mentioned, reported or accounted for
by the executrix. Suit was brought by one of the heirs who
had no knowledge of the existence of said property, and the
question of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud was raised. Syl.
1 concisely states the ruling of the court :
"The fraudulent concealment, by a testator's widow, of the common property, from the attention of
the probate court in the administration of testator's estate, was extrinsic fraud, and a court of
equity has jurisdiction to interpose and furnish appropriate relief from the final decree of distribution obtained by the employment of that fraud."
It is apparently the further contention of the defendants that plaintiff's mode of procedure is wrong, and that
she should have proceeded to endeavor io vacate the Decree
of Distribution in the Estate of Virtus F. McConkie.
The probate court is without power to reopen or vacate
its decree of distribution after expiration of the time to ap-
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peal. Mter six months has elapsed from the filing of a decree, the court is without jurisdiction, and hence powerless
to interfere with the decree; and the decree can be assailed
only in an independent equitable action, and for proper cause
such as prompted the instant action. Vol. 4 Bancroft's Probate Practice 2d Ed., Sec. 1171, p. 485; and Sec. 1176, p. 495.
And see: Noyes et al v. Agee, 53 Utah 360, 178 Pac. 753.
A person defrauded by the acts of an executor or administrator is not without means to correct the injustice.
Section 102-14-23, U.C.A. 1943, sets out a remedy to the
person so injured :
Mistakes in settlement may be corrected at any
time before final settlement and discharge, and
after that time by an action in equity, on such
showing as will justify the interference of the
court."
And see: In Re Rice's Estate. Rice v. Rice et al, 111 Utah
428, 182 Pac. 2d 111, quoting Cooley in his Law of Torts,
3rd Edition, p. 934, on the subject of "Wrongs by Deception," as follows:

" * * * It can never be either wise or safe to mark
out specific boundaries within which deceits shall
be dealt with, but beyond which they shall have
impunity; but each case must be considered on its
own facts, and every case will have peculiarities of
its own, by which it may be judged."
Judged by the evidence in the instant action, the Plaintiff has been deceived and defrauded to her prejudice, and
a grave injustice would be perpetrated if after establishing
that fact she was yet denied relief.
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ARGUMENT
ON
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS APPEAL
Plaintiff has cross appealed from the lower court's
finding and decision that the plaintiff failed in her proof
that Virtus F. McConkie at the time of his death was the
owner of 300 shares of the capital stock of the Whiterocks
Irrigation Company. We believe the evidence is such that
the lower court should also have impressed a trust upon
this water stock in the hands of the defendant J. Archie
McConkie. The 300 shares of stock in question represented
the water which was used for irrigation of the LaPoint
property. It is hardly to be expected this water would be
o"wned hy one person and the land by another and all of
the evidence adduced at the trial points to the fact that
Virtus F. McConkie was also the owner of the said shares
of stock.
The secretary of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company,
Mrs. Woolley, was called as a witness, and she produced the
minute book as well as certain other records of the company. From these it is definitely established that Virtus F.
McConkie was an officer and director of the Whiterocks
Irrigation Company shortly prior to his death on February
20, 1920. He was nominated and elected a director at the
annual stockholders' meeting of December 13, 1919 (Tr.
p. 72). It was stipulated at the trial that a person must
be a stockholder in order to be a director in said company
(Tr. p. 79). It also appears that as late as 1924 the assessment records of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company disclosed that said 300 shares of stock were listed and assessed
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againt Virtus F. McConkie. The names of J. Archie McConkie and William H. McConkie were not listed in

connectio~

with this 300 shares of stock and the records clearly disclose that the stock was being listed and treated as the
property of Virtus F. McConkie.
Certificate No. 12 in the Whiterocks Irrigation Company which was originally issued to John S. Hacking was
never presented for reissuance in the name of Virtus F.
McConkie, and it was not until the month of December 1944
that Archie McConkie secured affidavits as to the loss of
this certificate and presented them to the Whiterocks Irrigation Company. Again we request the members of the
court to carefully examine the affidavit ·signed by John S.
Hacking (Plaintiff's Exhibit D). As this affidavit was
first prepared hy Archie McConkie it read that John S.
Hacking in the year 1915 sold to Archie McConkie 300
shares of the capital stock of the Whiterocks Irrigation
Company. Apparently the old man JohnS. Hacking refused
to execute such an affidavit which had been pres·ented to
him and the same was partly erased and written over so
that it now correctly reads that in the year 1915 John S.
Hacking sold to V. F. McConkie (also known as Virtus F.
McConkie) said 300 shares. The conclusive evidence therefore in the files of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company is the
affidavit of John S. Hacking presented to said company by
the defendant J. Archie McConkie to the effect that this 300
shares of water stock had been sold by John S. Hacking to
Virtus F. McConkie and not to J. Archie McConkie (Archie).
It is also significant that it was not until the year
1944, shortly prior to the time the altered and mutilated
real estate assignments were presented to the State Land
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Board, that J. Archie McConkie went to the Whiterocks
Irrigation Company to have a certificate issued in the
place of one which had been lost or destroyed. If this stock
at all times since 1915 belonged to J. Archie McConkie, as
he recites in his own affidavit (Plaintiff's Exhibit E),
would not J. Archie McConkie have presented the certificate
to the irrigation company, or if he could not find it would
he not have then and there filed affidavits as to loss and
had the certificate issued in his own name? He sat by as
the stock assessments on these 300 shares came out in the
name of his father. They were so issued, for example, in
the year 1924 (Tr. p. 75).
The fraud is all woven out of the same piece of yarn.
Both the land and the water belonged to the deceased father, and the conspiring sons sat by for approximately twenty-five years before they presented the altered real estate
assignments and the fraudulent affidavit executed by J.
Archie McConkie for the transfer of the water. The corrected affidavit of John S. Hacking, who was also dead by
trial time, as to the ownership of the said water is the best
evidence in the record on this particular subject. Virtus F.
McConkie owned this water stock. On the strength of it
he was elected as a director in the Whiterocks Irrigation
Company. The same was assessed in his name and remained
on the assessment rolls in his name for almost twenty-five
years. Unfortunately, at the time of the trial the notary
on plaintiff's Exhibit D, Wallace Calder, was also dead. He
died in 1945 (Tr. p. 88).
Why did the two McConkie brothers at about the time
the lawsuit was started become apprehensive as to what the
records of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company might dis-
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close? The only purpose they would have in visiting the
secretary and reading the minutes would be to learn if there
was anything revealed therein which might be adverse to
their position (Tr. p. 73). Mr. Perry, the husband of the
plaintiff, also examined these records before and after they
were checked by the defendants, and at the second examination it was discovered that some of the pages from the
record books had been torn out and in particular a set of
minutes which referred to the election of Virtus F. McConkie to the Board of Directors of the Whiterocks Irrigation
Company (Tr. p. 87). Although the record is not positive
on this point, we believe the defendants tore out these pages
to further bolster their fraudulent position that the water
stock belonged to them and not to their father.
Neither of the defendants made any pretext of explaining how J. Archie McConkie acquired the stock in the
Whiterocks Irrigation Company notwithstanding the fact
that the affidavit of John S. Hacking recited that the stock
had been sold to the father, Virtus F. McConkie. In light
of this silence of the defendants, and upon a fair consideration of all of the documentary evidence pertaining to the
ownership of the 300 shares of stock in the Whiterocks
Irrigation Company, we submit that the lower court should
also have impressed a trust upon this water stock in the
hands of the defrauding sons and that this court should
now reverse the decision of the lower court to that extent.
CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing it is to be concluded:
1. At the time of the death of Virtus F. McConkie
there was vested in him the equitable title to what has been
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referred to herein as the LaPoint property, and the same
should have been listed as one of the assets of the estate of
Virtus F. McConkie, deceased. The trial court was clearly
right in declaring the defendant J. Archie McConkie a trustee of the LaPoint lands for the use and benefit of the
heirs of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, and in requiring
him and his brother and partner William H. McConkie to
account.
2. The assignment by the heirs in 1922 was based
upon and secured by fraudulent representation, and that
the decree of the court in 1924 did not have the effect of
distributing the LaPoint property to the respondents' mother.
3. The plaintiff is not barred from recovery because of the Statute of Limitations or laches.
4. Plaintiff's action in equity and her showing of extrinsic fraud practiced in the probate proceeding justified
the interference of the court.
5. The lower court should have impressed a trust
upon the 300 shares of the capital stock of the Whiterocks
Irrigation Company which represented the water used for
the irrigation of the LaPoint property.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE S. JOHNSON and
THERALD. N. JENSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
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